







Government support for ethanol production is expensive for
governments and costly for consumers
NO. 268, JULY 2008
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INNOVATIONWith growing public pressure to curb the rise in greenhouse gas emissions,
Canadian governments, like those in many other western countries, have chosen to
promote and  subsidize the development of ethanol as a fuel additive to gasoline. 
The purpose of this study is to examine ethanol policy's goals, evaluate the scientific
evidence that is used to justify government support for ethanol production, and
determine the costs to government and consumers. 
The key findings of the paper include: 
• The general body of scientific knowledge that weighs whether ethanol fuel
significantly reduces energy use or greenhouse gas emissions, once taking into
account the entire production cycle, is inconclusive. 
￿ Assuming that the use of ethanol has a positive impact on CO2 emissions,
public funds contribute approximately $368 for each tonne of CO2 reduced,
roughly seven times greater than the cost of alternative policy measures. 
￿ To the extent that ethanol policy is meant to act as a rural development tool,
ethanol mandates and production subsidies provide benefits to some farmers
while hurting others, with perhaps more being hurt financially than helped. 
￿ Increased domestic production of ethanol contributes to increases in food
prices, both directly and indirectly, for Canadian and foreign consumers.
Domestically, increased food prices cost consumers an estimated $400 million
each year. 
Given the findings of the study, federal and provincial governments should
reconsider  this policy thrust, and redirect government funds for environmental
policy to more promising measures.
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E
thanol production is frequently
praised for its purported contri-
butions to reducing greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions, and promoted
as a strategy to lower dependence 
on fossil fuels. 
Recently, Canada became a major booster 
of increased ethanol production: in 2007, the
federal government committed more than 
$2 billion in several multi-year programs to
encourage, promote and subsidize the
production and use of biofuels as an alternative
motor vehicle fuel. The government also
characterized this significant expenditure as part
of a federal effort to raise rural incomes by
supporting farmers.
1 In addition to federal
efforts, a number of provinces encourage ethanol
production through similar capital and
production subsidies.
This Commentary questions the wisdom of
such policies. It argues that there is no conclusive
scientific evidence that ethanol reduces GHGs or
energy use. Further it argues that associated
support programs for farmers are a double-edged
sword, penalizing the majority not involved in
ethanol production, and that increased ethanol
production has a serious impact on food prices.
Finally, the study argues that government
spending to reduce GHGs through increased
ethanol use is far out of line with  reasonable
alternatives. For every tonne of carbon dioxide
(CO2) offset under the current ethanol regime,
the average subsidy is $368. This is more than
seven times the cost of using alternative energy
policies to achieve the same reduction. 
Policymakers should reconsider the headlong
thrust into corn ethanol as a GHG reduction
policy. It cannot be justified once the significant
price effects, economic costs, and consequences
for income distribution in Canada and, indeed,
globally are considered. Instead, more cost-
effective GHG-reduction strategies that utilize
scientifically proven sources should 
be pursued. As our review of GHG emissions 
and energy demand for biofuels shows,
cellulose-based ethanol blends and solid bio-
fuels provide a more promising approach 
to reducing GHGs.
Ethanol and Public Policy
What is Ethanol?
Ethanol is a common alcohol produced by the
fermentation of organic matter, such as corn,
wheat or sugar cane and, more recently, by a
synthetic, petrochemical process. Ethanol is used
in alcoholic beverages and has several industrial
applications  in, for example, pharmaceuticals,
vinegar production, food extracts, cosmetics, and
solvents, as well as being a fuel additive. Corn is
the primary source of ethanol in the United
States, whereas a combination of corn and wheat
is used in Canada. Europeans rely on wheat and
sugar beets; in Brazil, ethanol is derived largely
from sugar cane. 
Another biofuel ingredient is cellulosic 
ethanol, which is made from straw, crop waste,
switchgrass, and certain wood products. These
different types of ethanol vary in terms of energy
and greenhouse gas emissions during production
and use. To avoid confusion, the term ethanol
used in this paper refers to corn ethanol unless
specified otherwise. 
Ethanol begins with crop production then
proceeds through a number of stages such as
fermentation and distillation before it is blended
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with gasoline by distributors for sale to
consumers as ethanol-blended gasoline (Figure 1).
Ethanol is commonly available with a ratio of up
to 10 percent ethanol to 90 percent gasoline, a
blend that will fuel most cars manufactured in
North America in the last 25 years. Another fuel
with a much higher ethanol content is E85, a
blend that is 85 percent ethanol and requires
automobiles to be specially designed to
accommodate such a high proportion of biofuel. 
In addition to ethanol, another alternative 
fuel is biodiesel, which can be burned in any
conventional, unmodified diesel engine. Biodiesel,
a non-petroleum-based fuel, can be produced 
from various sources such as canola oil and animal
fats, and can be mixed with various percentages 
of regular petroleum-based diesel.
Ethanol in the United States and Brazil
Government support for  ethanol production  has
existed  for almost 40 years. Although the use of
ethanol to power motor vehicles can be traced back
to the beginning of the automobile age, this energy
source remained on the back burner until the
foreign oil embargoes of 1973 and 1979. The
current push for ethanol stems from the evidence
that when ethanol-blended gasoline is combusted
in a motor vehicle engine, the exhaust contains less
environmentally harmful gases or GHGs than
gasoline without ethanol. As well, growing corn for
ethanol acts as a carbon offset by capturing CO2
from the air. Current US legislation provides
ethanol blenders with a tax credit of $0.13 per litre
(which will be reduced to $0.12 per litre in 2009
and 2010) alongside an import tariff of $0.14 per
litre (Food and Agricultural Policy Research
Institute 2008).
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
specifies that passenger automobile makers are
required to increase average fleet-wide gas mileage
to 35 miles per gallon (6.8 L/100 km) from the
2007 level of 27.5 miles per gallon (9.3 L/100 km)
by 2020. 
Furthermore, the Act requires that fuel producers
use at least 36 billion gallons (136 billion litres) 
of biofuel by 2022, up from 4.7 billion gallons 
(18 billion litres) in 2007, stipulating that 21
billion gallons (79 billion litres) of the 36 billion
must be from non-corn starch products.
2
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Figure 1:  Key Steps in the Production of Corn Ethanol Biofuel
Source: Renewable Fuels Association, Ethanol Industry Outlook 2002: Growing Homeland Energy Security, Washington.
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Upon examination, however, the policy has
important inconsistencies. Indeed, as Runge and
Senauer (2007) point out, the existence of
significant US tariff barriers to ethanol imports
belies the government’s assertion of environ-
mental goals. 
The current US policy is also driven by concerns
over energy security – and the attraction of a supply
of fuel free from the vagaries of world politics.
While the United States is now the largest producer
of ethanol in the world, Brazil is the highest per
capita consumer of biofuels for automotive
transportation. The oil crises of the 1970s propelled
Brazil into the biofuel era when its government
mandated the development of automobiles that
could function on sugar-based ethanol. The
directive was accompanied by heavy subsidies and
low taxes for producers and consumers of ethanol. 
Today, many cars in Brazil run on “flex fuel,”
allowing them to operate on either gasoline or
ethanol, or a blend of the two. For Brazil, ethanol
made from sugar cane has become a practical
alternative, since the country’s climate is conducive
to growing sugar cane. As a result, Brazil is a major
ethanol exporter.
Ethanol Policy in Canada
Large government subsidies to the private sector,
such as those required to produce ethanol, are
possibly justified on two theoretical grounds
(Rubin et al. 2008). The first rationale concerns 
a clearly identifiable failure of the market system 
so that the price and output for a particular good
do not reflect the true costs or benefits associated
with that product. In the case of ethanol, the
market failure is that gasoline users do not take
into account the cost, or environmental damage
caused by their use of gasoline, and fail to 
consider the benefits of ethanol. 
A second possible rationale is the encouragement
of rural development through a redistribution 
of public funds – in this case, largely paid for by
consumers and urban residents. Unlike in the
United States, domestic energy security in Canada
is not a major rationale for ethanol production. 
As we shall see, in Canada’s case, even if these
theoretical imperatives are met, the resultant
policies carry with them high costs for Canadian
consumers and for the federal and provincial
governments.
Numerous Canadian policies have been
implemented to promote ethanol, with an
assortment of benefits and costs. Government
supports for ethanol in Canada have changed
substantially over the last few years. In addition to
varying provincial and federal ethanol fuel-content
mandates, there exists a wide range of production
and capital subsidies. Subsidies can take many
forms, apply at all stages of production, and
include a fuel-tax exemption on the final product.
Another possible subsidy is for consumers who
purchase ethanol-fuelled cars (see Banerjee 2007
for a discussion of “feebates”). However, the 2008
federal budget removed the financial incentives to
purchase low-emission or ethanol-fuelled vehicles.
The policies outlined below represent the majority
of current direct federal and provincial programs
for ethanol production. 
Currently, Canada produces about two-thirds 
of its ethanol from corn and the rest from wheat.
Total ethanol production utilizes 500,000 tonnes
of wheat and slightly more than 1 million tonnes
of corn (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada
2006). In contrast, cellulosic ethanol represents
only about 0.2 percent of total ethanol
production. 
Corn production in Canada is concentrated in
three provinces. In 2006, Ontario accounted for
57.3 percent of Canada’s corn crop, Quebec for
36.4 percent and Manitoba for most of the rest.
3
Most ethanol production in Quebec and Ontario
is corn-based, while the majority of the
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Also, similar to the US, Canada maintains a tariff
of 4.92 cents per litre on imported ethanol, with
the exception of ethanol from NAFTA countries.
This subtly raises the price of cheap ethanol
imports, such as those from Brazil. In 2007,
Canadian ethanol imports were approximately 
500 million litres, or about two-thirds of total
domestic production.
4
FEDERAL SUPPORT: Until April 1, 2008, the
ethanol component of gasoline sold in Canada was
given a special exemption from the 10-cent-per-
litre excise tax on fuel.
5 However, this exemption
has been replaced by a producer credit program
that provides up to 10 cents for every litre of
ethanol supplied. The exact amount is based on a
measure of industry profitability, with the credit
declining as ethanol production becomes more
profitable.
6 Also, biodiesel production is given a
credit of up to 20 cents per litre. This program,
titled “ecoENERGY for Biofuels,” is slated to
provide $1.5 billion worth of production subsidies
to producers of ethanol and biodiesel.
The federal government is also providing capital
support for ethanol production facilities and
research. For capital assistance, individual loans of
up to $25 million are offered. Ottawa is also
providing $145 million worth of research grants
over several years, partly for biofuel research
through the Agricultural Bioproducts Innovation
Program.
7 A further $500 million is available for
research into non-food-based cellulosic ethanol
production, such as from straw, switchgrass 
and wood (Samson et al. 2008).
The federal government’s ethanol content
requirement is that, on average, ethanol or other
renewable products must be blended to constitute 
5 percent of all gasoline sold in Canada by 2010.
8
This does not mean that all gasoline must have 
5 percent ethanol, but that the national pooled
average must be 5 percent. 
Similarly, federal mandates for biodiesel require
that diesel and heating oil have 2 percent renewable
content by 2012. Assuming that the total amount
of energy demanded by Canadian drivers grows at 1
percent per year (the average growth rate since
2001), this will require that 2.2 billion litres of
ethanol be produced for Canadian consumption in
2012. This may fall if high fuel prices reduce
demand in the future.
PROVINCIAL POLICIES: For both the federal and
provincial levels, the array of fuel-tax exemptions,
content mandates and producer credits are
summarized in Table 1. Over the past year, pro-
vincial laws on ethanol have changed substantially
(the reported policies are accurate as of June 2008).
Four provinces – Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan
and British Columbia – have established ethanol
content standards in gasoline. Most provinces that
had a fuel-tax exemption for ethanol content have
moved to a direct producer credit, ranging from a
low of 9 cents per litre in Alberta to 20 cents 
per litre in Manitoba.
9
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4 Import data from World Trade Atlas 2007, production data from Canadian Renewable Fuels Association,
http://greenfuels.org/lists.php#ethProd.
5 The exemption depends on the proportion of ethanol in the fuel. For example, if 10 percent of the fuel is ethanol, then 10 percent of the fuel
is tax-free, making the federal excise tax nine cents per litre.
6 Specifically, the producer credit is calculated as a function of the necessary price of ethanol to ensure profitability on sales up to a certain
limit. The maximum credit will be 10 cents per litre from 2008 to 2010, eight cents per litre in 2011 and decline by one cent per litre each
year to four cents per litre when the program is scheduled to end in 2017. See http://oee.rncan.gc.ca/transportation/ecoenergy-
biofuels/incentive.cfm?attr=12 for more details.
7 See http://www.agr.gc.ca/index_e.php?s1=prog&s2=ecoabc-iieb&page=faq for details of these programs.
8 Bill C-33 authorizing a nationwide mandate of ethanol content in fuels passed third reading in the House of Commons on May 29, but had
yet to receive Senate approval and royal assent as of June 24, 2008. 
9 Manitoba’s support involves a 20-cents-per-litre subsidy to blenders starting in 2007/08. The subsidy is reduced by five cents per litre every
two years. There is no subsidy after 2016. www.gov.mb.ca/stem/energy/ethanol/index.html.Commentary 268 | 5
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Some provinces, such as Ontario and Quebec,
vary the amount of subsidy based on the expected
profitability of the ethanol industry. Production
capacity is largely concentrated in Ontario,
Manitoba and Saskatchewan, with 1 billion, 
140 million and 277 million litres of ethanol
production capacity expected by 2010 in these
provinces, respectively.
Ethanol as Farm Aid and a Rural 
Development Tool
Federal capital subsidies to ethanol production
facilities increase as the percentage of facility
owners who are farmers increases, clearly
indicating that the program is intended to assist
farmers. However, there will be winners and losers
from ethanol subsidies among different types of
farmers and rural residents. 
Slightly more than half of all corn grown in
Canada is used as animal feed with the remainder
allocated to human or industrial consumption.
10
Recent analysis of the livestock industry suggests
that farmers have seen increases in the monthly
average of feedstock prices for corn and wheat of
between 20 percent and 30 percent over the
period 2002 to mid-2007 (Mussel et al. 2007).
This is at least partly due to growing ethanol
demand. 
Ethanol policy will thus benefit some farmers at
the expense of others. Proportionally, there are
46,000 more livestock production farms than corn
Table 1. Federal and Provincial Legislation on Ethanol and Biodiesel (as of June 2008)
Province Producer Credit Fuel-Content Mandate Fuel-Tax Exemption Capital Subsidies
British Columbia N/A 5% for both ethanol 




Alberta Between $0.09 and $0.14/L 
based on producer size




based on producer size
7.5% for ethanol Phased out in 2007 $80 million capital program
Manitoba Currently $0.20/L, declining to
$0.10/L by 2013
8.5% for ethanol 
by the end of 2008
N/A N/A
Ontario Variable based on profitability,
up to $0.11/L
5% for ethanol 
as of 2007
Phased out in 2005 Capital assistance 
of up to $0.10/L
Quebec Up to $0.18.5/L if 
crude oil under $65/barrel,
otherwise zero
N/A Biodiesel exempt N/A
Nova Scotia N/A N/A Biodiesel exempt N/A
Federal Up to $0.10/L 5% for ethanol by 2010,
2% biodiesel by 2012
Phased out April 1, 2008 Up to $350 million for first-
generation biofuel facility
capital and research
Sources: Various Provincial biofuel program documents; Mussel et al. (2007); Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada.| 6 Commentary 268
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and grain farms.
11 Owners of agricultural land,
however, will be ethanol policy’s main
beneficiaries as the higher prices of farm products
are capitalized in higher land prices. Owners of
marginal land may also benefit as more acreage is
put into corn and/or wheat production. 
Ethanol versus Gasoline: Energy and
Greenhouse Gas Reductions
From an environmental perspective, the bottom
line for ethanol policy is determining whether
shifting consumption to ethanol from gasoline
reduces greenhouse gases without increasing overall
energy use. When ethanol is blended with gasoline,
the final consumer emits less greenhouse gases 
than he/she would using undiluted gasoline.
However, once the complete production process 
of ethanol is taken into account, it is unclear
whether ethanol production uses less energy and
emits less greenhouses gases overall. Yet current
policies, both federal and provincial, do not 
reflect this uncertainty.
Ethanol and Energy Demands
The production of ethanol as a motor fuel additive
requires several steps utilizing various forms of
energy. The growing of corn, for one, requires
fertilizer, machinery for preparing fields, seeding and
harvesting, followed by the milling and distilling
processes to create the ethanol. The pure ethanol
then has to be shipped to wholesalers for blending
with gasoline. Table 2 below highlights the steps of
ethanol production that release or sequester CO2
and consume energy or create co-products, such as
livestock feed.
The current body of scientific knowledge offers a
wide range of estimates of the net energy balance in
producing ethanol. Some studies suggest that,
relative to gasoline, it takes more energy to produce
ethanol than what is delivered (Pimentel and Patzek
2005, 2007; de Oliveira et al. 2005), while others
suggest that ethanol can generate two-thirds more
energy than gasoline when considering the energy
used and produced at all stages in the production
and use of both fuels (Shapouri et al. 2004). 
The net energy balance depends on variables such as
the energy used to produce the crop itself, the
grinding, processing, and transportation of the fuel,
distillation and fermenting, the energy used to
manufacture the farm equipment and a host of other
items. A recent paper published in the journal 
Science (Farrel et al. 2006) compared six major recent
studies on the energy requirements of biofuels and
found that the results are highly sensitive to the
assumptions used by researchers. Hence, the research
debate regarding the net energy requirements to
produce ethanol suggests that there is not yet any
definitive answer to whether or not the production
of ethanol requires more energy than is embodied 
in the final product. Once considering all factors
involved in the production and use of gasoline, 
the likely range of ethanol’s net energy balance is
between producing marginally more net energy 
than regular gasoline and producing slightly less 
net energy than gasoline, but with most estimates
suggesting the former.
That said, the net energy balance of all stages 
of production is a limited metric, as some forms 
of energy are more useful than others. Energy in
liquid form has greater flexibility than energy
produced from, say, burning coal; consequently, 
this contributes to a higher market price per 
unit of energy from ethanol or gasoline than 
from coal. 
Importantly, however, for the end consumer,
ethanol delivers less energy per litre than regular
gasoline. Gasoline produces 35 megajoules (a unit
of energy) per litre, whereas corn-based ethanol
produces only 21 to 23 megajoules per litre (Davis
and Diegel 2007). Hence, a 5 percent ethanol
content mandate by volume rather than by energy
content will require that more fuel – either
gasoline or ethanol – be consumed to make up for
the lost energy from using a less energetic fuel. In
other words, users will have to fill up more often
to drive the same distances with ethanol fuel. Cars
that run on E85 fuel have lower average volu-Commentary 268 | 7
metric fuel efficiencies (19.9 L/100km in the city;
14.0 L/100km on highways) than cars that run on
regular gasoline (12.9 L/100km in city driving,
8.7 L/100km on highways).
12 The same is true,
although to a lesser degree, for vehicles that use a
5 to 10 percent ethanol blend – ethanol blended
with gasoline at 10 percent has 97 percent as
much energy per litre as regular gasoline (Davis
and Diegel 2007).
Ethanol and Greenhouse Gases
In support of government subsidies and reduced
excise taxes, federal and provincial governments
have argued that corn ethanol is a fuel that
produces appreciably lower levels of GHGs than
gasoline. While there is strong evidence that the
“tailpipe” emissions – exhaust from vehicles – are
reduced when ethanol is used in place of gasoline,
this ignores the net life-cycle emissions of ethanol
production. There now exists a broad range of
recent studies on the net GHG emissions of
biofuels (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada
1999, 2000; Crutzen et al. 2007; Samson et al.
2008; Lipman and DeLucchi 2002). Farell et al.
(2006), in their analysis of such studies, find an
average GHG reduction of about 7 percent from
current production of corn ethanol as opposed to
unblended gasoline, but caution that results vary
from place to place and may increase net GHG
emissions if the ethanol is produced in a GHG-
intensive manner. They conclude that only
cellulose ethanol offers significant reductions in
GHG emissions, a nearly 90 percent reduction in
GHGs relative to regular gasoline. 
A summary of research by Natural Resources
Canada reports that Canadian blended ethanol
using 10 percent corn ethanol would reduce GHG
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
12 Natural Resources Canada Fuel Consumption Ratings for 1,056 different versions of 2008 model vehicles. 
Table 2. Simple Schematic of Life Cycle GHG Emissions on Energy Processes for Ethanol Production
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13 Some differences between corn and wheat ethanol production are worth noting. Wheat ethanol production in Manitoba, for example, has the
benefit of using emissions-free hydroelectric power, reducing the pollution in the production stage. Wheat ethanol is also more effective in
reducing emissions from co-products used in animal feed. However, this is offset by the fact that Western wheat uses a more GHG-intensive type
of fertilizer and delivers less energy than corn ethanol (Natural Resources Canada 2003).
14 If demand for fuel grows at slower rate after 2008 due to rising prices, this will decrease the total subsidy given to meet production demands.
However, this will marginally increase the subsidy per litre as the fixed capital subsidy will be spread over a smaller volume of production.
15 Samson et al. (2008) use 0.021 GJ/L, as that is the estimated efficiency of ethanol-blended fuel at a lower temperature used for measurement.
However, the Canadian Renewable Fuels Association uses 0.023 GJ/L in their estimations; this higher energy efficiency is used in all calculations.
emissions per litre of fuel by 3 to 4 percent while a
10 percent cellulose biofuel would lower GHG
content by 6 to 8 percent (Forge 2007). Net life-
cycle emissions from Canadian wheat- and corn-
based ethanol are not substantially different.
13
Cellulosic ethanol derived from the by-products
of wheat and corn production – such as corn
stover or wheat straw, instead of the original corn
or wheat – does reduce net GHG emissions
relative to corn or wheat ethanol (Agriculture and
Agri-Food Canada 2006). But the potential to
expand the production of ethanol from wheat and
corn by-products is limited. Thus, as a review of
GHG emissions and energy demand for biofuels
shows, while there is little agreement on the effect
of corn or wheat ethanol on GHG emission levels,
cellulose-based ethanol blends provide a more
effective approach to reducing GHGs.
Evidence that ethanol-blended gasoline results
in fewer GHGs than gasoline itself is extremely
important for justifying government support. But
it is clear from the evidence to date that there is
no consensus regarding the efficacy of corn-based
ethanol to either reduce GHGs or reduce overall
energy demands. Taking into account these facts,
subsidizing ethanol production and consumption
lacks dependable logic.
The Impact and Effectiveness of
Ethanol Policy
The Impact of Ethanol
We have seen that a 5 percent blended ethanol
will have, at best, a marginal impact on GHG
reduction. However, even with the most
optimistic position on the effectiveness of ethanol
policy in reducing GHGs, a critical policy
question is: to what extent do federal and
provincial subsidies and mandates accomplish
their environmental goals? Before answering,
several assumptions must be made for this
analysis:
￿ Gasoline energy demand at the national and
provincial levels is projected to grow at the same
rate to 2012 as their respective averages from 
2001 to 2007.
14
￿ Ethanol demand is entirely met with domestic
production starting in 2010. 
￿ Estimated national ethanol production is the 
total of each province’s production, based on the
amount needed to satisfy the higher of currently
proposed national or provincial mandates
applicable in the given year. For example,
estimated ethanol demand in Manitoba will 
be 8.5 percent of total fuel demand, based on
provincial requirements. In contrast, ethanol
demand in Alberta in 2010 will be 5 percent 
to satisfy the federal content mandate.
￿ Estimated ethanol production and subsidies from
2007 to 2010 are based on the actual and expected
production capacities of ethanol plants either
operating or under construction, based on
information from the Canadian Renewable 
Fuels Association. (See Table 3.)
Federal and provincial ethanol-content standards
are based on the total volume of fuel that contains
ethanol, not the amount of energy therein. As
noted earlier, corn ethanol contains between 21 and
23 megajoules (MJ) of energy per litre, whereas
regular gasoline has approximately 35 MJ per litre.
In other words, for the same volume of fuel,
ethanol produces approximately two-thirds the
amount of energy as gasoline (Davis and Diegel
2007).
15 For a given car, it will take the same
amount of energy to move between two points,
regardless of the type of fuel used. If a car usesCommentary 268 | 9
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16 This is the sum of 62.03 kg/GJ in CO2 emissions and 16.4 kg/GJ in N2O expressed in the equivalent amount of CO2 emissions. Canadian
corn ethanol has a lower CO2 content than US corn ethanol that emits approximately 100.3 kg/GJ of CO2 equivalent emissions. See Samson
et al. (2008).
17 Using greenhouse gas life-cycle emissions software GHGenius 3.11.
ethanol-blended gasoline, it will require a greater
volume of fuel, relative to regular gasoline, to travel
the same distance.
The level of GHG emissions is directly related to
the amount of energy produced from the ethanol
and gasoline used, but also depends on the energy
and emissions required in the production of the
fuels. In fact, the total amount of CO2 equivalent
emitted from producing and burning pure
Canadian corn ethanol is 62.03 kg/GJ 
16whereas
regular gasoline emits 99.56 kg/GJ of CO2
equivalent (Samson et al. 2008). During the
production of corn ethanol, another major
greenhouse gas nitrous oxide (N2O) is produced,
accounting for one-fifth of all GHG emissions
from ethanol. Total GHG emissions from the
production and use of corn ethanol in Canada are
78.43 kg of CO2 equivalent per GJ of energy. 
It should be noted that other types of biofuels
will result in different net GHG balances
depending on the type of fuel and the specific
production process. For example, according to
estimates from Natural Resources Canada,
17
Canadian wheat ethanol does have lower net GHG
emissions than US production of corn, partly due
to the lower emissions from predominantly
hydroelectric power sources used in Canada.
However, wheat and corn ethanol have similar net
GHG emissions when both are made in Canada
(Natural Resources Canada 2003). 
The different environmental impacts of biodiesel
and ethanol are also important. The production
and use of biodiesel can result in half the amount of
greenhouse gases it takes to produce and use
traditional diesel. But the net GHG balance of
biodiesel varies widely since it can be produced
from varied sources such as animal waste products,
fats and canola oil. Expected domestic production
of biodiesel is expected to be considerably smaller
than gasoline ethanol – approximately one-fifth by
2012 – and is currently less than one-tenth of
current ethanol production. Because biodiesel
Table 3. Gasoline and Ethanol Demand, Energy and CO2 Equivalent Emissions, 2007 – 2012
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Fuel Demand (million litres)
Total gasoline demand 41,313 41,696 42,084 42,474 42,869 43,267
Ethanol demand with mandates 1,068 1,082 1,096 2,247 2,274 2,302
Actual ethanol produced 762 1,092 1,667 2,247 2,274 2,302
Energy Produced (million gigajoules)
Energy produced by ethanol and gasoline 
offset (Million Gigajoules)
18 26 39 53 53 54
Tonnes of CO2 Equivalent
Total CO2 equivalent emitted from ethanol 1,967,560 2,012,671 3,072,456 4,140,916 4,191,405 4,242,667
Tonnes of CO2 equivalent from gasoline offset 2,497,644 2,554,909 3,900,213 5,256,529 5,320,621 5,385,693
Total CO2 equivalent offset from ethanol mandates 530,085 542,238 827,757 1,115,613 1,129,216 1,143,026
Source: Author’s calculations. Canadian Renewable Fuels Association. “The Supply and Disposition of Refined Petroleum Products in Canada.” October 2007.
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makes up a considerably smaller share of biofuels
production than ethanol, it is not analyzed in 
the study.
According to the estimates presented here,
somewhat less CO2 equivalent will be emitted by
using energy from ethanol as opposed to producing
the same amount of energy from traditional
gasoline. Under the currently proposed federal 
and provincial renewable fuel mandates, the total
amount of CO2 equivalent offset will likely be
around 1.1 million tonnes by 2010 and beyond. 
To put this in perspective, this amounts to approx-
imately 30 kg of CO2 equivalent  per Canadian.
Jaccard and Rivers (2007) calculate a similar
expected offset in CO2 equivalent of 1 million
tonnes from ethanol mandates. 
The Cost of Ethanol Subsidies
It is helpful to compare the effectiveness of
replacing gasoline with corn ethanol to the amount
of subsidies given to ethanol producers to reduce
GHG emissions. The estimated total amount of
federal and provincial subsidies up to and including
2009 is based on expected production capacity.
After 2010, subsidies are estimated based on the
amount of fuel needed to meet federal and
provincial renewable fuel content standards.
Estimates of the total subsidies include (i) the
amount of producer credit, (ii) the capitalized
annual costs of research grants and (iii) the
opportunity cost of federal loans given on 
generous terms. 
Assuming that domestic ethanol production can
meet the 2010 federal and provincial mandates,
total annual subsidies to ethanol producers from
both the federal and provincial levels will approach
$400 million. Between 2007 and 2012, the total
federal and provincial subsidies for ethanol capital
and production – excluding biodiesel and second-
generation ethanol grants and subsidies – will be
nearly $1.9 billion (Table 4). 
As production increases and federal and some
provincial subsidies decline, the subsidy per litre of
ethanol will decline from 26.8 cents per litre in
2007 to 16.7 cents per litre in 2012. At the
consumer level, the effective subsidy will fall from
1.34 cents per litre of 5 percent blended fuel in
2007 to 0.84 cents per litre by 2010.
How cost effective are ethanol subsidies in
reducing greenhouse gases? Using the cumulative
amount of GHG offset and the cumulative subsides
given through 2012, it will cost the federal and
provincial purses roughly $368 per tonne of CO2
equivalent that is offset by ethanol. The cost per
tonne of CO2 equivalent offset will be reduced to
$335 per tonne by 2012. In comparison, the costs
of CO2 offset from US, European and Australian
ethanol subsidies range from a low-end estimate of
$330 per tonne to more than $700 per tonne
(Metcalf 2008, Steenblik 2007). However, if net
greenhouse gas emissions increase from ethanol
production and use, as some studies suggest, then
the government subsidies will actually cause an
increase in GHGs. 
Table 4.Total Federal and Provincial Subsidies to Ethanol Producers per Litre of Ethanol Produced and 
Tonne of CO2 Equivalent Offset, 2007–2012
Source: Author’s calculations. Note that calculations do not include subsidies for biodiesel or cellulosic ethanol.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total Subsidies
Producer and capital subsidies ($million) 204 238 297 382 386 383 1,891
Subsidy per litre of ethanol (cents per litre 
actually produced)
26.8 21.8 17.8 17.0 17.0 16.7 18.3
Subsidy/tonne of CO2 equivalent offset 
from gasoline 
540 440 359 343 342 335 368Commentary 268 | 11
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Current prices in world markets for offsetting
CO2 are in the range of $30 per tonne, with
upper-boundary estimates of the future offset
cost at $200 per tonne by 2020 (Rivers and
Sawyer 2008). Thus, when measuring the cost of
subsidies versus the environmental benefits, the
federal subsidy is excessive. Also, Samson et al.
(2008) show that biodiesel subsidies are  only
marginally more cost-effective, costing $98 to
$114 per tonne of CO2 offset. But these CO2
offset subsidies are only part of the total cost of
ethanol. A 70-cent-per-litre production cost (the
current production cost used in Shapouri and
Gallagher 2005) suggests that the value of raw
material, capital and labour inputs used to
produce all ethanol in Canada would be more
than $1.5 billion in 2010 alone, far more than
the federal and provincial subsidies given 
that year. 
The opportunity cost of the public subsidies
spent on ethanol is considerable. The efficacy of
energy replacement programs depends on the
sources that are being replaced. Government
subsidies for biofuel production can be more cost
effective when solid biofuels – pellets from wood
and grass – are used to displace coal-generated
electrical power rather than trying to replace
liquid gasoline. For example, $48 of government
subsidies for solid biofuels can reduce one tonne
of GHG emissions from a coal electricity
generating facility (Samson et al. 2008). Another
alternative for liquid fuels is cellulosic ethanol,
but the subsidies given to cellulosic ethanol are
still likely to be at least $118 per tonne of CO2
offset (Koplow 2006). Production costs for
cellulosic ethanol are still well above those for
corn and wheat ethanol, and future reductions in
production costs may not be sufficient to make
this form of ethanol competitive with them
(Steenblik 2007).
Ethanol and Food Prices
Increased demand for corn by the ethanol industry
has had a significant impact on nearly all food
prices, through the higher cost of inputs for other
food production and the higher costs of agricultural
land. In May 2008, the one-year futures price of
corn at the Chicago Board of Trade was around
$6.50 per bushel, compared to just over $2.00 a
bushel two years earlier.
18 As a result, the agri-food
industry, which uses corn and wheat as an input for
a wide range of products, must now pay higher
prices. A recent report from the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) estimated there will be a 20 percent to 
50 percent increase in food prices in the next
decade (OECD 2007). While not holding biofuel
demand solely responsible for the expected
increases, the report notes that it is a key factor in
the upward price pressure (Doornbosch and
Steenblik 2007). In Mexico, a country with a corn-
based diet, the price of tortillas has increased 60
percent. And, in response to public pressure, the
Mexican president has imposed price controls on
certain corn-based products. The United Nations
World Food Program notes that it is increasingly
difficult to provide food aid to poor nations
because land has been diverted from food to much
more lucrative ethanol feedstock production 
(Blas and Wiggins 2007). 
As cropland is diverted from corn-for-food to
corn-for-domestic-fuel, the quantity available for
export will drop and the price will rise. However,
there may be a windfall gain from the price rise to
subsistence farmers in less-developed countries who
will profit from higher corn prices, perhaps
providing them with a source of capital for
improvements to agricultural productivity. If,
however, they also switch to crops for ethanol
production, the food shortage will be accentuated.
Further, a doubling or tripling of corn or wheat
prices can lead to a significant rise in the value of
arable land, resulting in a windfall for owners of
18 Chicago Board of Trade website accessed June 18, 2008.19 OECD (2006) and Teneycke (2007).
20 Forge (2007). 
21 Testimony of Edward P. Lazear Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on
“Responding to the Global Food Crisis” Wednesday, May 14, 2008 http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/lazear20080514.html
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agricultural land, but not necessarily for the farmers
or farm workers. 
As long as ethanol subsidies are in place, it is
likely that corn prices will rise along with a greater
annual harvest devoted to ethanol production. But
is there sufficient arable land to expand corn
production? The OECD estimates that to replace
10 percent of transportation fuel with biofuel,
Canada and the EU would have to devote between
30 percent and 70 percent of current crop areas to
biofuel feedstock production.
In 2006, 2.77 million acres of land in Canada
was devoted to corn production. By 2007, this had
risen to 3.5 million acres.
19 It is estimated that to
reach Canada’s biofuel target of 5 percent of total
fuel consumption by 2010, approximately one-half
of the current farmland used for corn will be
required.
20 And as more corn is devoted to ethanol,
prices of corn starch, corn syrup and other corn-
based products will rise. 
To the extent that Canada dedicates more wheat
production to ethanol, there will be a host of
similar price increases. In contrast, cellulosic
ethanol can be grown on marginal land that would
not otherwise be used for production, meaning it
would have a negligible impact on food prices. As
well, if cellulosic ethanol production becomes more
efficient, this will increase the return on switchgrass
production relative to corn and wheat farming.
However, as with most other agricultural products,
switchgrass production is more productive on
higher-quality land using fertilizers than on
marginal lands. Therefore, without restrictions on
the type of land that cellulosic ethanol can be
grown on, “second generation” ethanol production
will continue to affect food prices.
Income Distribution
The current and proposed subsidies to encourage
and support the production of ethanol constitute a
major public expenditure. Politicians have stated
that these subsidies are good for farmers and
generally good for rural areas of the country, but
there has been little study on the overall economic
impact of such transfers, especially taking higher
food prices into account. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to disentangle the
effects of ethanol policy and production on food
prices from other factors, such as higher food
demand from developing countries and higher
energy prices. No comprehensive study has been
conducted on the impact of Canada’s ethanol policy
on food prices, although the situation is now being
investigated in the United States. Empirical
estimates of the increase in food prices that isolate
the effect of ethanol mandates, tariffs and credits in
the US suggest that biofuel policy has led to an
increase in consumer expenditure of $4.7 billion
dollars, an approximately 0.5 percent increase in
total US food expenditures compared to a baseline
where there is no mandate for ethanol content in
fuel, tax credits or tariffs (Food and Agricultural
Policy Research Institute 2008). Edward Lazear,
Chairman of the US Council of Economic
Advisers, reported that the increase in US
production of ethanol has led to an increase in
world food prices of approximately 1.2 percentage
points, but that the effect of ethanol-supporting
policies is still indeterminate.
21
Tokgoz et al. (2007) and Tokgoz and Elobeid
(2006) model the marginal increase of US ethanol
production and higher oil prices on the price of
agricultural feedstocks. To the extent that
production credits and mandates act in the same
ways as higher oil and gasoline prices to improve
the profitability of ethanol producers, the
estimates in Tokgoz et al. (2007) of higher food
prices can also apply to ethanol production credits
and mandates that bring ethanol producers to the
point of profitability. They predict higher food
prices based on  higher feedstock prices for wheat
and corn. 
The crucial assumption is that Canadian
producers behave in a similar manner to US
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producers, and that there is an analogous increase in
food prices from comparable market conditions.
The expected increase in food prices and personal
expenditures on food products as a result of ethanol
subsidies are shown in Table 5. In 2004, the most
recent year with detailed consumption data,
Canadian consumers spent approximately $67
billion on food products. On average, domestic food
prices are expected to increase by around 1.1 percent
using a baseline of ethanol production not
artificially supported by subsidies. Certain domestic
food products will rise in price by up to 7 percent,
whereas fruits and vegetables – which are mainly
imported and do not use corn and wheat in their
production – are assumed to be immune from
ethanol-related price increases, but may increase
due to other factors not investigated in Tokgoz 
et al. (2007). 
The estimate of how much consumers are
paying for food due to higher ethanol production
is presented in Table 5. These estimates are
calculated using two steps, first by estimating the
increase in the cost of food on total consumption,
and second, by estimating  the expected fall in
consumer demand due to higher prices.
22 In total,
Canadian consumers can be expected to pay
roughly $400 million more annually for food
items due to ethanol supports. As these are 2004
estimates of Canadian food consumption, more
recent data would likely yield larger total costs
because of higher total expenditures on food. The
estimates in Table 5 represent the minimum
economic costs, since they do not account for the
aggregate economic losses in a constrained market
supply for food.
This increase in food costs is effectively a transfer
of wealth from consumers to producers of corn and
wheat. Since the increased demand for corn and
wheat from the ethanol-producing sector raises
input costs for other agricultural firms and
percolates down the supply chain, taxpayers are
making an indirect transfer to ethanol producers.
The demand for corn and wheat by ethanol
producers is driving up the price of ethanol
feedstock. As a result, the profitability of ethanol
producers is being eroded, potentially engendering
calls for even greater subsidies. 
The total estimable wealth transfer to farmers is
the sum of direct ethanol subsidies and indirect
transfers from consumers caused by higher food
prices. Based on the above estimates and the total
amount of subsidies offered, these wealth transfers
will amount to more than $600 million in 2008
and some $800 million in 2012. 
However, there are other forces at play in setting
Canadian food prices. Canada’s ethanol program is
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
22 A demand-price elasticity of 0.5 is assumed for most goods. Some goods that are considered more price elastic or inelastic were adjusted
based on prevailing empirical estimates. Not including the estimate of lower-consumption increase, the cost to consumers is nearly $850
million in increased consumption costs. 
Table 5. Increase in Canadian Food Prices due to Ethanol Policy  using 2004 Food Expenditures
Sources: National Economic Accounts, Statscan; Tokzog et al. (2007).




Increase in Cost for
Consumers ($ million)
All Food 1.1 67,387 424
All Food at Home 1.2 35,322 280
Meat 3.7 8,213 159
Dairy Products 2.1 6,809 78
Fruit and Vegetables 0 5,396 0
Other 0.8 14,904 42
Restaurant Meals 0.9 32,065 144| 14 Commentary 268
small compared to that of the United States, whose
market has a strong influence on the world price for
agricultural commodities. Canadian ethanol
production is only one factor in setting domestic
food prices.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Canada’s ethanol policy has several disconcerting
features. First, the provision of large subsidies to
encourage ethanol production distorts agricultural
markets and food prices in Canada and elsewhere.
Second, the scientific evidence concerning the
reduction in GHGs and energy consumption
afforded by switching to blended biofuels is
questionable. Finally, a simple analysis of the costs
and benefits associated with ethanol policies
suggests that the government is paying seven times
more than it could be if ethanol policy were
explicitly geared to reducing GHG emissions. 
In short, Canada’s current ethanol policy imposes 
a significant cost on Canadian and foreign
consumers, benefits only a few groups of Canadian
farmers at the expense of many others, contributes
to rising global food prices and has a large fiscal
cost for government. More cost-effective policies
are available.
Given the knowledge vacuum in which ethanol
promotion policies have been framed, it would be
prudent to place a moratorium on any further
support for this initiative. The federal government’s
plan does provide a limited window to redirect
some of the committed resources to explore
cellulose ethanol technology and production. This
involves a significant $500 million seven-year grant
to develop large scale cellulosic “second generation”
production facilities, such as the Investing in
Cleaner Fuels program.
23
The main drawback to cellulose ethanol at this
time is the cost of production. While there are
some commercial plants in the world and at least
one in early stages of production in Canada,
lowering production costs remains a significant
research challenge. Given the major advantages of
cellulose ethanol over corn ethanol in terms of land
use, GHG emissions, energy needs and impact on
food prices, it would be prudent to scale back the
nearly $2 billion commitment to corn and wheat
ethanol production and allocate a portion of that to
the commercialization of cellulose ethanol and solid
biofuels. 
Upon review of the reasons that underpin federal
government and provincial ethanol programs, 
and in light of the questionable evidence regarding
corn ethanol’s effectiveness in combating GHG
emissions, one is prompted to ask why govern-
ments are pursuing these policies. The answer
seems to be growing public demand for environ-
mentally friendly policies. Regrettably,  ethanol
programs were launched without adequate research
or a detailed examination of their consequences.
Given the widespread belief that ethanol-blended
fuel has a strong mitigative effect on global
warming, it will take political will to admit that
current policy is misguided, and offers little if any
contribution to reducing greenhouse gases.
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